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RESEARCH ARTICLE

How to Put the Collapsed Lebanese Banking Sector
on the Right Track?
Danielle Khalife*, Jad Yammine, Tatiana El Bazi
USEK Business School, Lebanon

Abstract
The revival of Lebanon involves regaining trust in its banking system. Starting by highlighting the main banking
sector's inefﬁciencies in Lebanon, as well as the bad investment practices that have led to the current ﬁnancial crisis, a
full business model that could restore conﬁdence in the Lebanese banking sector, and increase its proﬁtability in the
foreseeable future is proposed. This new business structure tackles three main areas including, cost reduction, liabilities
management, and income generation, is suggested with evidence on how this model could play a major role in the
upcoming recovery period and lead to positive ﬁnancial results.
Keywords: Restructuring, Lebanese banking sector, Cost reduction, Liabilities management, Income generation

1. Introduction
nce referred to as the “Switzerland of the Middle
East,” Lebanon now faces its worst crisis since
the civil war. Lush mountains and snow-capped peaks
aside, the country owes this title to its renowned
banking sector, famous for its strict banking secrecy
law adopted in 1956. Data collected by Lebanon's
Central Bank (Banque du Liban - BDL), as well by
private banks operating in Lebanon, shows that the
banking industry was one of the most proﬁtable economic sectors in Lebanon following the end of the
Lebanese Civil War in 1990, and as per Schimmelpfennig and Gardner (2008) it can be attributed to two
main factors, ﬁrstly, local banks ﬁnanced the majority
of the State's and Central bank's debt, secondly, the
high remuneration strategy adopted to attract the
country's widespread diaspora. In addition to the
banking secrecy law, the primary role played by the
banking sector in boosting Lebanon's GDP in the prewar era can be attributed, in part, to the massive inﬂux
of petrodollars coming in from neighboring Arab and
Gulf States, a laissez-faire economy, and a ﬂexible
exchange rate system. According to Nessimian (2019),
if this huge capital inﬂow was well deployed and
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employed in long-term development plans, it would
have had a favorable inﬂuence on the entire economy,
and led the country to prosper, especially by attracting
investors and generating employment possibilities.
However, after the war, Lebanese banks began to
lend money to the State at a rate of return much higher
than the interest rates paid to depositors. Gaspard
(2004), advocated that the unrealistic levels of interest
rates paid by the government to the banking sector
were one of the main reasons that drowned our
country in debt. As a result, local banks were no longer
interested in investing in the private sector. Marot
(2018) stated that this created a “crowding out effect”,
the large return of sovereign debt hindered the private
sector's vitality, local banks began to predominately
lend the public sector and losing interest in the private
sector. Additionally, given that the country had just
emerged from a 15-year civil war, few people were
willing to invest their savings in long-term projects
and instead preferred depositing them at local banks
in exchange for exceptionally high interest rates. This
increased the deposit base of local banks, as well as the
latter's investments in government bonds. Local
banks also placed a large part of their deposits at the
Central Bank. In fact, according to Moubayed and
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Zouein (2020), it is estimated that 75% of all deposits in
local banks are invested within the State. With very
little credit going to productive sectors, such as agriculture and industry, the Lebanese economy became
more rentier than productive. They abetted for
ﬁnancing the obsolete services sector at the expense of
the productive, proﬁtable sectors (Talha, 2003). In
2020, the share of the services sector amounted to
86.36% of the total GDP compared to 7.34% for the
industry sector and 2.25% for agriculture. With the
adoption of a currency peg system against the US
dollar, the exchange rate was no longer a reﬂection of
the country's economic growth. Rather, the ﬁnancial
sector became oversized relative to Lebanon's economy, while productive sectors all but vanished.
With the unfolding of the current economic crisis
and the decrease in the inﬂow of remittances from
the Lebanese diaspora, coupled with the little
ﬁnancial aid from Gulf countries and the West,
Lebanon's currency peg, which was described for
more than 20 years as an anchor of ﬁnancial and
social stability, has become a burden for the country. Baumann (2019) argued that the currency
devaluation, which the Lebanese banking sector
tried to elude since 1992 through the currency peg,
veiled long-term fundamental problems. In fact, the
Lebanese pound is rapidly losing its value despite a
series of measures imposed by the Central Bank in
hopes of stabilizing the exchange rate. While the
ofﬁcial exchange rate remains at LBP 1507.5 per US
dollar, the black-market rate has reached an unprecedented LBP 24,000 to the dollar.
Today, the lack of conﬁdence in the banking
sector, due to its inability to give depositors their
money back after the State became practically
insolvent and defaulted on its internal and external
debt, the lack of foreign currency inﬂows, the rapid
devaluation of the Lebanese pound against the US
dollar, the lack of solutions or actions, the ﬁscal
deﬁcit, the soaring inﬂation, economic contraction,
unemployment, the political standstill and several
other factors have all contributed to the crash of the
Lebanese banking sector. The World Bank (2021),
through its Lebanon Economic Monitor, ranked the
prevailing turmoil among “the top 3” most acute
crises that occurred worldwide since the mid-nineteenth century while highlighting that there is no
apparent watershed shortly.
One of the most essential reforms that must take
place to put Lebanon's economy back on the right
track is restructuring the ailing banking sector, which
will be paramount to ensuring long-term growth and
to building a productive economic model. The ultimate purpose of such a process will be to fully
recapitalize banks, restore their sol$132#vency and

regain public trust. Banks must rush to implement a
considerable restructuring agenda ensuring a
reasonable distribution of losses among economic
agents, build new business models, and take advantage of the upcoming period to ﬁnd a way out of the
turmoil.
In an effort to boost liquidity by attracting dollars
from abroad and preventing capital outﬂows, the
Central Bank issued the circular no.154 instructing
local banks to raise their capital by 20% and repatriate 3% of the liquidity from correspondent banks.
However, many banks have struggled to meet this
requirement, as no shareholders or investors are
willing to inject fresh dollars in a sector that is no
longer proﬁtable. Some reports have even indicated
that banks have been purchasing large amounts of
dollar banknotes from the black market to increase
their liquidity. This would partly explain the rapid
devaluation of the Lebanese pound in recent weeks.
According to the latest plan published by the
Central Bank in circular No. 158, depositors will be
compensated using the remaining required reserves
in foreign currency along with banks’ deposits with
correspondent banks over one year, which will increase the money supply that will weigh heavily on
the exchange rate.
In light of this brief overview, this study aims to
outline a new business structure that could restore
conﬁdence in the banking sector and increase its
proﬁtability in the upcoming period. However,
rather than placing this liquidity at BDL in the form
of reserves, where it is likely to slowly deplete hard
currency reserves on subsidies, it would have been
far more beneﬁcial for the economy if it were
injected in the form of investments. It is high time
for Lebanon to gradually lift subsidies on government services and essential products and strengthen
its national currency and its citizens’ purchasing
power through a thriving economy that was widely
discussed in our previous study published in May
2020, entitled “The Economic and Financial Crisis in
Lebanon: Major Problems and Reform Plan.”
This will require a complete revamping of the
banking sector and a redesign of banks' investment
strategies and their relationship with BDL and the
government. In the ﬁrst part, we will highlight the
banking sector's main inefﬁciencies and poor investment practices that have led to the current
ﬁnancial crisis. In the second part, a restructuring
business model will be proposed, addressing three
main areas in the banking sector: cost reduction,
liabilities management, and income generation.
Hence, we will illustrate how this business model
could play a major role in the upcoming recovery
period and lead to positive ﬁnancial results.
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2. The Lebanese banking sector at a glance
Monetary policy is seen by Central banks as an
effective strategy for preventing any downturn in
the economic activity by controlling the major
macroeconomic factors like preserving low levels
of inﬂation, and unemployment using tools like interest rates, government securities, and banks'
required reserves. After 15 years of civil unrest, the
government decided to rebuild the country by offering attractive remuneration in order to attract
foreign depositors. These rates not only contributed
to an increasingly rising debt but also hampered the
development of the business sector because banks
tended to invest in Treasury Bills, at the expense of
risk diversiﬁcation.
Since 1997, the Central Bank, along with the
Government, pegged the Lebanese Lira to the
Dollar at the rate of LBP 1507.5 against the U.S
Dollar. This parity generated an arbitrage opportunity allowing investors to earn enormous/significant proﬁts through betting on the disparity in the
interest rates without being disclosed to the currency risk. As per Poddar et al. (2006), BDL's
monetary policy can be deﬁned by two key objectives: ﬁrstly, the disparity between interest rates on
foreign-currency deposits paid by Lebanese banks
and those on international markets, aiming to increase the ﬁnancial inﬂow to cover the deﬁcit and
foreign debt, and secondly, the interest rate differential between the Lebanese pound and the US
dollar incentivizing LBP deposits. In order to protect the Lebanese Pound, BDL's high-interest rates
policy has resulted in a rising liquidity shortage or
tightening on both the government and private
sector due to the high costs of funding or rates
while deepening the deﬁcit and aggravating the
weak ﬁscal policy. The Central bank performed as a
ﬁnancial intermediary/middleman charging the
banking sector massive interest rates while granting the public sector liquidity at a cheaper price.
According to Saidi (2020), this policy resulted in
cumulative losses for the Central bank valued in
April 2020 at over $46 billion and still accumulating.
In 2016, BDL initiated its ﬁnancial engineering
schemes when a swap operation occurred between
the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, the
Ministry of Finance ﬁrst exchanged $2 billion worth
of Eurobonds for the corresponding value of debt in
Lebanese lira. In return for fresh dollars, and at an
unspeciﬁed rate, the Central Bank subsequently
marketed the $2 billion Eurobonds to Lebanese
banks. The World Bank (2016), warned that this
operation may have increased the reserves in
foreign currency, however, such practices may
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worsen the macro-ﬁnancial vulnerabilities due to,
by that time, our weak ﬁnancial system and an
absence of clear economic reforms.
The second ﬁnancial engineering scheme started
in 2017, when banks that deposited USD with the
Central Bank were remunerated with a 6.5% interest
rate and were entitled to an LBP loan from BDL
equivalent to 125% of the initial USD deposit at a 2%
interest rate. This same amount can be redeposited
at the Central Bank at a 10.5% interest rate.
In March 2019, the Central Bank's loans to commercial banks unexpectedly and sharply plummeted to $14 billion (LL 21 trillion equivalent) after a
continual and steady rise from $5.6 billion in
January 2017 to $35.4 billion in February 2019. $21
billion worth of loans were erased. This amount is
deemed substantial as it surpasses the annual government budget. While claiming that it was done to
eliminate the disparity between the Central Bank's
assets and liabilities yet, the reason behind this
process is unknown but coincided, by that time,
with the release of the quarterly ﬁnancial data of the
commercial banks (see Fig. 1).
Zougheib (2020), explored the challenges, and
risks faced by Lebanese banks, the author employed
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique to
assess their efﬁciency, the main ﬁndings of this
research proved that the government itself poses the
greatest threat to Lebanese banking institutions, due
to the high level of loans provided to the sovereign,
highlighting that it is critical for banks that the state
retains control over its resources. At the end of 2019,
the commercial banks' assets at the Central Bank
were valued at over 60%, while before the introduction of the ﬁnancial engineering operations, or at
the end of 2015, this ratio was around 44%. Hence, it
is conspicuous that these schemes have substantially increased the exposure of our commercial
banks to the Central Bank. This is a clear indication
of the banks’ risk management inefﬁciencies, as
they followed a concentrated investment strategy
without diversifying their portfolio, in return for
high yields, and while neglecting the private, and
productive sectors.
Awdeh (2019), stated that a Central bank can inﬂuence economic growth by altering the deployment of credit facilities, especially by inducing and
circulating greater capital into business activities to
ﬁnance the private sector. However, in 2019, around
25% worth of loans were devoted to the private
sector using the commercial banks' broad deposit
base; approximately 40% of this proportion was
allocated to real estate investments (including 19%
for mortgages, 16% for construction, and 5% for real
estate and rent services), along with 23% and 12% to
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Fig. 1. Commercial banks' assets at the Central bank.

ﬁnance businesses, and personal loans, respectively. Thus, even for the private sector's loans,
there was not enough diversiﬁcation, and most of
the investments were placed in real estate-related
sectors.
In 2019, the deposit base reached 302% of GDP; it
reached its peak in 2017. These values are substantially high compared to international benchmarks;
however, it was a consequence of the banking system's overreliance on high remuneration to tempt
depositors. The ﬁgures above reveal that our
banking sector's deposit base compared to the GDP
is among the highest in the world. Additionally, the
Lebanese banking sector recorded the highest value
of deposits to assets when compared to the international and regional benchmarks. Another wasted
opportunity, as if a proper long-term development
plan was well implemented, it would have led the
whole country and economy to thrive (see Figs.
2e4).

This created an opportunity for the banking sector
to ﬁnance economic activities and boost economic
growth. However, due to investment mismanagement and high-yield policies, as well as an unproductive and inefﬁcient government, have led to
the current shutdown in the system. In their
study, Moubayed and Zouein (2020), stated that the
collected deposits in foreign currency that were
placed at the Central bank in return for exceptional
proﬁts, resulted in “disintermediation”, increased
ﬁnancial suppression, and raised interest rates on
the LBP denominated loans which hindered our
economic expansion, and increased the levels of
non-performing loans.
As per the latest published data, Lebanon's NonPerforming Loans as a percent of all bank loans
registered 33% at the end of 2020, compared to
15.19% in the previous year. According to the
World Bank (2021) Lebanon Economic Monitor
(LEM), considering the absence of signiﬁcant

Fig. 2. Total deposits in the banking sector (% of the GDP).
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Fig. 3. World's highest bank deposit base compared to GDP.

Fig. 6. Non-Performing loans - Lebanon.

Fig. 4. Deposits with respect to assets.

Fig. 5. Cumulative percentage point change in banks' NPLs.

reforms, a sustained degradation of the consumer
loans is anticipated. It is expected that this ratio has
increased and will continue to increase owing to
several factors but most importantly due to the high

level of unemployment affecting the productivity of
individuals and eroding their purchasing power.
This level is alerting as in two years it has only
surpassed the average NPLs level compared to
countries that faced similar banking crises (according to the ﬁnancial data of countries that encountered comparable banking crises to Lebanon, the
Non-Performing Loans Ratio increased on average
by 20% throughout an average period of 5.3 years),
highlighting the importance of implementing signiﬁcant restructuring measures. According to Ari
et al. (2020), that examined the dynamics of NonPerforming loans during 88 banking crises, mitigating the risks and trying to resolve NPL issues
before the downturn are critical for the recovery
phase (see Figs. 5 and 6)
Throughout the years, the Central bank collected
an adequate amount of foreign currency reserves, in
order to maintain the currency peg, reaching nearly
$36.77 billion in October 2017, around 75% of our
country's GDP, which was one of the main reasons
that increased the conﬁdence in our banking system
(Awdeh, 2018). However, the ﬁnancial system has
recorded signiﬁcant gaps between the total number
of deposits and the remaining foreign currency reserves at BDL. Despite the latest decrease in deposits, the system's gap has considerably widened
due to the massive drop in reserves. The remaining
reserves reached critical levels, and they are not
sufﬁcient anymore to pay back the depositors or to
support imports. A restructuring plan is needed to
stop the gap without printing additional LBP to
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Fig. 7. Reserves excluding gold v/s foreign currencies deposits (Million of USD) - May 2021.

ﬁnance the losses, as this will have major consequences on the LBP exchange rate. Conﬁdence in
the banking sector must be restored in order to
encourage investment and capital inﬂows (see
Fig. 7).
The central bank gross reserves are now close to
$15.7 billion, where net reserves are negative, as
Banque du Liban owes banks way more than the
remaining reserves. At this level, the remaining reserves are referred to as “mandatory minimum reserves” and deﬁned as the 15 percent of deposits
required by banks to be held at the central bank.
Thus, the ﬁrst 85 percent has been spent. The role of
the mandatory reserves is ostensibly to protect the
banking sector from a shock that is similar to the
Intra Bank collapse in 1966. Today, every single
Lebanese bank is Intra, so they are no longer sufﬁcient to bail out the system. According to the balance of payments report, published monthly by
BDL, an average of almost $1 billion per month is
walking out of the country from the central bank. If
this continues at the same path without making
drastic changes in the monetary policies, BDL's cash
reserves will be consumed within 16 months. At that
point, we would have to sell gold, which would buy
us another, 17 months approximately, based on the

value of gold holdings as of the last BDL balance
sheet report.
Serious actions must be taken to stop the bleed
and restructure the whole banking system in order
to ensure an efﬁcient and smooth recovery.
Based on the World Bank's (2020) latest published
data, the graphs clearly show that the banking
sector in Lebanon is over-sized compared to the
Arab world, MENA Region, and the rest of the
world. While the number of branches per 100 K
adults has smoothly decreased in the past years, the
numbers are still considerably higher than regional
and international benchmarks. This implies that the
banking sector encounters signiﬁcant costs that
should be readdressed (see Figs. 8 and 9).
The table below points out the high operating
costs or cost margins of our Lebanese banks
throughout the years. These numbers must be
reconsidered, the banking sector must implement
signiﬁcant measures in order to reduce these high
costs as it cannot remain operating accordingly
especially with the persistent loss of income (see
Table 1).
The banking sector has always been one of the key
drivers of economic growth, and a vital ﬁnancing
source, particularly in the early phases of economic
revival, especially through its ability to gather deposits, grant loans to customers, ﬁnance important

Fig. 8. Commercial banks branches per 100,000 adults.

Fig. 9. Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults.
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Table 1. Management efﬁciency of Lebanese banks (2019).
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Cost per average branch (US$ million)
2.01
2.10
2.18
2.19
2.56
2.46
Stair expenses per average staff US$ 000s)
45.8
48.4
51.3
50.7
54.0
53.3
Staff expenses to general operating expenses (%)
54.6%
55.6%
56.4%
55.8%
52.1%
54.5%
Cost to income (%)
49.7%
51.8%
51.5%
50.3%
44.3%
48.3%
Cost to average assets (%)
1.51%
1.5%
1.48%
1.44%
1.59%
1.4%
Source: Bankadata Financial Service, Banking industry 2018 and the Consolidated balance sheet of all bank 2020.

2018

2019

2.38
53.7
56.57%
50.48%
1.26%

2.23
49.75
55.25%
52.19%
1.20%

Table 2. Lebanese banking sector growth rates.
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Assets
8.4%
9.6%
9.3%
4.8%
5.9%
Loans to Customers
11.4%
15.1%
11.0%
5.6%
2.0%
Customer deposits
8.8%
9.6%
8.5%
4.5%
3.6%
Shareholdersʼ equity
13.4%
8.5%
10.8%
6.9%
9.9%
General Operating Expenses
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Net proﬁts for the year
7.6%
0.2%
9.1%
6.9%
12.6%
Source: Bankdata Financial Service-Banking industry 2018, and the Consolidated balance sheet of

Fig. 10. Capitalization metrics.

business activities such as agriculture, and industry,
and many more, and their ﬁgures can be signiﬁcant
to track the economic growth. However, by checking
the numbers of our banking sector, represented in
the table above we can clearly perceive a severe
drop-down in ﬁnancial performance, highlighting
the effect of the crisis that started showing in the
ﬁnancial ﬁgures of 2019 (see Table 2).
The capital adequacy ratio, which measures the
bank's capital with respect to its risk-weighted and
credit exposure, slumped from 17.8% in 2018 to
10.28%. This decrease is alerting as it denotes a
higher risk of failure. A similar metric is the equityto-asset ratio that fell to 8.43% in 2019, down from
9.6% to 8.9% in 2017 and 2018. The capitalization
metric also referred to as the ﬁnancial leverage ratio,

2017

2018

6.8%
7.8%
2.3%
3.8%
3.3%
2.0%
6.6%
0.4%
6.2%
3.1%
4.3%
5.0%
all banks-2020.

2019
11.2%
16.5%
6.7%
15.8%
6.8%
NA

measures how far an institution operates on its equity. In the case of our banking sector, it increased
from 10.5 times in 2017 to 10.85 times in 2018,
reaching 11.52 in 2019. Higher ﬁnancial leverage is
alarming as it aggravates the risk of insolvency (see
Fig. 10).
Two of the most important proﬁtability and return measures used are the return on average equity and average assets. The ROAE which
measures the ﬁrm's performance to its average
outstanding shareholders' equity, unfortunately,
came negative; it registered 8.3% in 2019, way
below international benchmarks as the MENA region average in 2018 was 11.6%, emerging markets
15.3%, and worldwide 13.7%. Simultaneously, the
return on average assets of the Lebanese banking
sector, which measures how productive a company
is with the resources it has, reached 0.72% in
2019, compared with an average of 1.6% for the
MENA region, 2.0% for emerging markets, and a
worldwide average of 1.7%. Undoubtedly, the repercussions of the prevailing ﬁnancial crisis started
to be portrayed through the ﬁgures of 2019, as the
key metrics came negative and way below the international benchmarks (see Figs. 11 and 12).
The total number of banks operating in Lebanon
is 61, divided between 44 commercial banks, 14
investment banks and 3 specialized banks. Our
banking sector heavily relies on commercial
banking with a limited focus on investment banking
that could be used efﬁciently to manage the banks
portfolios and generate a reasonable income. Even,
most of those divisions of the existing investment
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interest rates environment attracted the banks to
fully invest in the public sector. This structure
should be reconsidered and more diversiﬁcation is
required to enhance the sector's riskereward proﬁle
(see Fig. 13).

3. Methodology

Fig. 11. Return on average Equity (2019) 1.

After addressing the inefﬁciencies of the banking
sector compared to international and regional
benchmarks, restoring conﬁdence in the banking
system is crucial to rebuilding our nation and
economy. Banks must hasten to implement a signiﬁcant restructuring agenda ensuring an equitable
distribution of losses among economic agents, build
new business models, and take advantage of the
upcoming period and as per our analysis three
main areas must be tackled including, cost reduction, liabilities management, and income generation. Thus, in the upcoming part, we will elaborate
a detailed restructuring proposal addressing the
topics mentioned above.

4. Results and discussions
Fig. 12. Return on average Assets (2019) 1.

Fig. 13. Banking sector operating income - 2019.

banks are inactive in Lebanon, and many potential
services that could increase the banking sector's
return on investment could be introduced within
the new banking model as they could play a leading
role in the upcoming era, creating a strong recovery potential for the Lebanese banking sector.
Numbers conﬁrm that banks' incomes are mostly
generated from commercial banking activities with
around 86.4% of their revenues classiﬁed under interest and fee income. This shows that a lower
weight is given to investing activities, as high1

4.1. Cost reduction
There is a broad consensus about the downsizing
of the banking sector as the number of existing
banks is high. A smaller banking sector in a smaller
economy would undoubtedly result in some improvements. It is achievable through mergers,
which will be performed by introducing new legislation under the Central Bank guidance. According
to the authorities and analysts, the banking sector
must be halved or reduced by 50%.
Nonetheless, the main determinants of the size of
the banking sector are the business environment,
market behaviors, economic circumstances, and the
rivalry among banks, not the government. In addition to the economic downturn, the banking sector
is currently inﬂuenced by several market factors,
such as the deterioration of the deposit base and the
number of loans allocated to the private sector, but
most importantly, the loss of conﬁdence in this
sector. These drivers will force banks to assess
which scenario brings more value to their institutions along with the central bank's intervention,
whether by merging with other banks or leaving the
market. Thus, will contribute reasonably to identifying the sector's size.
In addition to the size of our banking sector, the
number of branches is considerably high compared

Lebanon's data are based on 2019's ﬁgures. However, global returns are based on data from 2018.
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to the country's size, which engenders higher
operating costs. One of the cost-cutting measures
and a helpful way to reduce these unwanted expenses is to evaluate, and pare down inefﬁcient
branches to cope with this turmoil, strengthening
banks' revenues, and improving their capital. As
mentioned previously, the number of branches per
100 k adults is approximately 22 branches in
Lebanon, which is substantially high. Therefore, it
must be reduced by a minimum of 50% to meet
international standards and benchmarks. Instead,
banks need to reduce physical branches, expand
their digital products and services, such as online
accounts, and shift towards intelligent branches.
When reaching a low margin, these digital technologies play a major role in ensuring long-term
sustainability through an efﬁcient cost management
strategy.
Moreover, the overwhelming number of
personnel and their allocated beneﬁts negatively
affect the banking system's overall operational costs.
Hence, to increase the sector's efﬁciency, unlock cost
savings, and minimize expenditures, this number
must be reconsidered by reducing staff and their
beneﬁts while preserving and seeking talented employees, to help their institutions to succeed and
generate higher revenues. Nonetheless, these actions can be seen as a double-edged sword as they
may generate unfavorable outcomes by increasing
unemployment rates and impeding the productivity
and efﬁciency of the remaining employees. This
economic downturn highlighted the importance of
improving our reliance on digital channels in the
banking sector and investing more in technology at
the expense of people, branches, and real-estate as if
employed efﬁciently; it is a powerful way to cut
down on stafﬁng costs (see Fig. 14 and 15).

Fig. 14. Branch staff per 1000 active customers.
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Fig. 15. Total core sales per branch staff, indexed to 2015.

A study done by McKinsey & Company in 2019,
on the US banking sector revealed that banks that
reduced the workforce signiﬁcantly and maintained
only talented and competent teams were wellpositioned and more prone to prosper. A fast fall in
the number of employees (red line of the ﬁrst
graphic) generates a 39% growth in sales (red line of
the second graphic). Lebanese banks must take
similar proactive steps, such as keeping only able
employees, in order to maximize future income.
Thus, undoubtedly technology holds the key to
reducing the overall operational costs and margins.
Automation is the key to successful outcomes by
targeting banking services and making effective use
of the prevailing technologies. This could lead to
optimal implementation of cost management strategies, as closing branches and reducing staff solely
is insufﬁcient. This is achievable by tackling
different areas such as improving online banking
and encouraging its use instead of branches and call
centers, and expanding the number of “e-branches.”
The shift towards intelligent branches, when
appropriately performed, has favorable outcomes
on the bank's overall efﬁciency. Besides reducing
real-estate requirements and ownerships, banks can
ofﬂoad basic transactional activities from employees, leading to pruning the workforce, avoiding
new recruitment without inﬂuencing the overall
business activity, and still offering the same services
and maintaining their customer base (see Fig. 16).
According to a study published by McKinsey &
Company in 2018, e-branches can strengthen the
branch's performance from 60% to 70% in terms of
cost-cutting and higher turnover. Given that traditional units have the highest levels of operational
expenditures, this shift's inﬂuence is reﬂected positively in signiﬁcant areas; mainly, by delivering a
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Fig. 16. Effect of the shift to e-Banking on sales, cost and proﬁt per
branch.

higher level of sales, diminishing the overall cost
per branch, and boosting proﬁt.
4.2. Liabilities management
As mentioned in the ﬁrst part of this study, 75% of
the banking sector's portfolio is invested in the
Central Bank, which the latter used to ﬁnance the
sovereign's obligations. Thus, since the government
defaulted, the Central Bank and Lebanese banks
must undertake serious measures:
BDL must declare an aggressive restructuring
plan portrayed through a severe haircut on banks as
we can no longer bend the unvarnished truth, which
may be hard to believe for the Lebanese, but is
undoubtedly crucial.
As per our numbers, and according to the Central
Bank's latest published data, deposits in foreign
currencies account for approximately $107.874
billion as of May 2021. In parallel, there are around
$15.708 billion of foreign currency reserves in cash
and $5 billion securities that are not liquid, resulting
from the participation in the ﬁnancial markets.2 The
banking sector cannot sustain in a system where the
Central Bank has $107.874 billion liabilities, and its
existing foreign currency reserves are no longer
liable to cover these obligations (see Table 3).
Serious actions need to be taken to cease this severe
gap without printing more LBP, as this will cause an
additional devaluation of the local currency, and

which will lead to a major spike in the inﬂation rate.
Therefore, as mentioned previously, the Central
Bank should announce a signiﬁcant haircut on
banks by 60e70% as per our suggestion. This percentage might be aggressive, but this is the only way
to halt this disparity in order to meet the existing
liabilities as numbers become more reasonable.
Banks accumulated signiﬁcant proﬁts through
high yields for the past 30 years. However, this investment strategy proved to be abortive and ineffective in the long run. Therefore, they should bear
responsibility and handle the losses by accepting
this step (see Fig. 17).
By applying a haircut of 60e70%, we shall be able
to lessen or cease the gap between the Central
Bank's liabilities and the remaining foreign currency
reserves. In this case, numbers become more
reasonable, which in turn will attract foreign investors, as a deleveraging cycle is deemed to be a
great time to reinvest and create new investment
opportunities. The remaining foreign currency reserves should not be used either to cover losses or to
carry on with the subsidies programs. Instead, this
amount should be well deployed by investing in
diverse ﬁnancial activities that will lead to a higher
expected return in the future (that will be discussed
later). This generated return will be used to pay
back the remaining amount of the liabilities/deposits. The investment plan should reﬂect a new
vision or strategy to improve the banking sector's
performance by meeting international standards.
As we know, in Lebanon, we suffer from low
standards of transparency. Therefore, data are not
widely accessible nor published regularly. However,
the latest data concerning the distribution of the
deposits by tranches were published back in
January 2020. We applied these ratios to the current
value of the foreign currency deposits provided by
BDL as of May 2021. These estimations might not be
entirely accurate but could be used to initiate a
preliminary restructuring plan.
The Central Bank must announce a standardized
liability restructuring program that includes: an
aggressive haircut of 60e70% on banks, a standardized haircut and deposits restructuring plan,
and a mandatory capital raise that should be well
deployed to re-boost the ﬁnancial system.
Following the suggested Central Bank's haircut
decision, the banking sector will be automatically
split into two categories. A limited number of
banks can approve BDL's measures and will be

2
As per some economic experts, these numbers provided by the Central Bank of Lebanon might be inﬂated. However, in this study we will base our
suggestions on BDL's provided data.
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Table 3. Distribution of deposits by tranches - May 2021.
Account Tranches

% Depositors
(as per Jan 2020)

% of Total Deposits
(as per Jan 2020)

$ Value (in $ billion)
(applied to FC deposits in May 2021)

< $3500
$3.5k-$100k
$100k-$1M
>$IM
Total

59.64%
31.9%
7.61%
0.84%
100%

1%
13.7%
36.3%
49%
100%

1.079
14.779
39.158
52.858
107.874

Fig. 17. Haircut simulation. Note: All ﬁgures are in million of USD.

Fig. 18. The banking sector following the haircut decision.

willing to remain operating. However, we expect
that 60e70% of banks become insolvent or declare
bankruptcy as most of them cannot tolerate such
decisions. Therefore, the government takes their
ownerships and merges them all, resulting in
having one single public bank. Furthermore, the
government must follow the same standardized
plan to compensate defaulted banks' depositors.
This will be reﬂected positively on the banking
sector by reducing its size.
3

Below, you will ﬁnd a detailed explanation of the
suggested standardized plan based on deposits
distribution by tranches3,4 (see Fig. 18):
4.2.1. Accounts below $100,000
These accounts constitute about 91% of the depositors. The haircut is not imposed on these accounts; the bank is required to repay these
obligations fully, 30% of the amount will be settled in
the dollar (around $4.757 billion), and the remaining

These numbers are based on the analyst's suggestions and must be revised based on actual data.
For simplicity, one haircut on each tranche was suggested, while in practice, it is more credible to apply a progressive haircut, as it is more equitable for
depositors.
4
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amount in LBP at a speciﬁc rate and with certain
limits to prevent the devaluation of the currency. The
payments will occur in multiple installments over a
determined period of 5 years with no grace period.
4.2.2. Accounts between $100,000 and $1,000,000
They are around 7.61% of the depositors valued at
$39.158 billion. Several measures must be applied,
starting with capital control to limit the inequitable
foreign currency outﬂow. Moreover, these funds are
subject to a 60% haircut, reducing their value to
approximately $15.663 billion that shall be paid in
several increments over 10 years with 2 years grace
period.
4.2.3. Accounts above $1,000,000
These are high net worth individual investors,
constituting approximately 0.84% of the overall
number of depositors. These investors are supposed
to be knowledgeable and educated but were still
willing to take this high level of risk and made
considerable proﬁts. The bank must apply a minimum haircut of 80% that way, the value of deposits
will be reduced from $52.858 billion to approximately $10.572 billion paid over a period of ten years
with 2 years grace period.
Thus, over ten years, along with two years of a
grace period, the banking sector's and government's
liabilities in foreign currency will be around $30.992
billion. As mentioned previously, the existing foreign
currency reserves should not be used to ﬁnance
these obligations. Instead, sustainable banks must
compensate depositors using the returns earned
through their new investments and ﬁnancial activities (that will be elaborated in the following part). In
addition, the government must reimburse these obligations from its investment in a pool of assets
(electricity, oil, and gas if available, Casino du Liban,
etc.) that was widely discussed in our previous study
published in May 2020, entitled “The Economic and
Financial Crisis in Lebanon: Major Problems and
Reform Plan.” Note that deposits will be reimbursed
after the haircut and no interest shall be paid.
The implementation of this strategy will
contribute to the revival of the banking sector,
which will attract foreign investors and create investment opportunities in the country.
4.3. Income generation
As mentioned previously, over approximately the
past three decades, our banking system was geared
towards conventional banking activities. Lebanese
banks worked as intermediaries (convenient places
to stash and retrieve cash). Tempting clients with

high yields, banks created a society with an overreliance on the traditional banking activities satisﬁed with the easy and quick cash generated while
neglecting risk alternation and diversiﬁcation.
Which, if were taken into consideration, we could
have avoided the prevailing crisis.
The Banking sector has to learn from past missteps by expanding its services portfolio to diversify
the risk and prevent future comparable crises from
regaining investors and customers' conﬁdence while
generating a new source of income to compensate
old depositors and thrive again. Nonetheless, as
mentioned previously, the imposed capital raise and
the remaining amount of foreign currency reserves
must be invested and deployed to reshape the
banking sector to meet international standards and
not cover losses.
One of the most efﬁcient ways is to reimagine the
banking sector's structure by introducing new divisions granting us access to international capital
markets like investing in equities, ﬁxed income, and
derivatives markets and including structured products while emphasizing their importance. To achieve that, banks have to enhance their dealing
rooms, especially since banks are already wellequipped but do not efﬁciently use their investment
resources. Additionally, banks should invest in
diversiﬁed banking activities such as private equity,
venture capital, investment banking, real estate, and
corporate banking to enhance the riskereward
proﬁle. In the following part, you will ﬁnd a proposal of the new banks' structure and their divisions
according to the international banking sectors
standards.
Our proposed banking structure consists of
switching to “Universal Banking” that merges
traditional commercial banking services along with
investment banking services into a single establishment. The old banking model created a society
with excessive dependence on conventional
banking activities while neglecting the importance
of investment banking activities. Investment banks
are gates to ﬁnancial markets, and a blend of
advanced, well-evolved, and established investment
banks, along with various proﬁtable products, not
only increase the institutions' return but signiﬁcantly contribute to the overall economic growth,
especially, by increasing liquidity in the market (see
Fig. 19).
Additionally, one of the alternatives to compel the
banking sector to improve its business models
and adopt new digital developments is to invest in
FinTech. These are tech companies that present
ﬁnancial products and services. Throughout the
years, global FinTech investments have expanded
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Fig. 19. Banking sector's suggested structure.

rapidly and vastly. It grants clients the capability of
managing their accounts remotely, starting from
simple services such as transferring payments via
their smartphones to loan applications through a
video conference. Reputable banks and ﬁnancial
companies around the globe tend to invest in these
technologies to lower their cost, increase their
proﬁtability, and, most importantly, expand their
client base.
Below you will ﬁnd Figures from advisory company KPMG revealing that global FinTech investments registered $105.3 billion in 2020 with a
total of 2861 deals (see Fig. 20):
Another way to generate considerable income is
by shifting towards algorithmic trading and artiﬁcial

intelligence, which have been growing dramatically
in recent years; ﬁnancial institutions employed them
to obtain an advantage over other market participants. These emerging technologies and the extensive use of automation are considerably improving
ﬁrms’ operational costs, along with their client
satisfaction. Algorithmic trading has proved to
generate higher income than manual trading along
with lowering the number of personnel and the
overall cost.
Hence, we can afﬁrm that our economic recovery
must be deﬁned by a prolonged period of development of the economic and business activity
especially by creating new investment opportunities. The banking sector must play a crucial role in

Fig. 20. Total global investment activity (VC, PE, and M&A) in FinTech (2017e2020).
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Table 4. Estimated annual return per business segment.
Segments

Estimated Average
Annual Return on
Equity as per JPMorgan

Consumer & Community Banking
Corporate & Inversment Bank
Commercial Banking
Assets & Wealth Management
Corporate & Private Equity
Financial Advisory & Consultancya

31%
14.7%
17%
26%
NA
23.01%

Average Annual Return

22.34%

a

This number has been taken from the industry average.
Source: JPMorgan chase co. Annual Report- 2019

ﬁnancing these investments to contribute to their
success. This highlight and emphasizes the idea that
the imposed capital raise should be well deployed
and put in the right place to reshape our economy
and prosper.
Below you will ﬁnd the estimated average annual
return on equity per business segment as per JP
Morgan Chase (see Table 4):
As per our plan, you will ﬁnd below an estimation
of our banking system's return vs. its liabilities in the
following part.
Banking Sector's Liabilities in billions of USD if
the suggested plan is applied:
The table above represents the banking sector's
obligations in foreign currency over twelve years,
including two years of grace period if the suggested
plan is implemented. The ﬁrst two years, Lebanese
banks owe depositors $ 0.9514 billion (represents
their obligations to depositors having less than
$100,000 solely), the following three years, the banks'
liabilities increase to reach $3.5749 billion (as the
grace period of the accounts having between
$100,000 and above ends). Until the end of the plan's
timeline, the banking sector's liabilities will become
$2.6235 billion. This amount decreases starting from
the 6th year as depositors having less than $100,000
will be fully compensated (see Table 5).
According to our analysis, the banking system
needs a minimum of two years to kick off. Thus, the
ﬁrst two years' obligations will be reimbursed using

the existing required reserves, which is around
$15.708 billion (as per BDL's publications) along
with the amount generated from the mandatory
capital raise; we assume the banking sector was only
able to raise $3 billion. Therefore, the remaining
reserves, along with the capital raise account for
around $ 18.708 billion, is the source to ﬁnance or
settle the ﬁrst two years' liabilities; we have to
deduct them from the prementioned value. The
remaining amount, which is around $16.805 billion,
represents the estimated capital to be deployed and
invested in the banking sector in order to meet international standards.
The suggested plan is split into two phases, the
pre-operating, and implementation phases. The
banking system needs time to thrive and revive
again. Therefore, in the ﬁrst two years, that are part
of the pre-operating phase, banks will only
encounter and settle losses. Then, following these
two years, a new banking model will be fully
implemented through the efﬁcient and rational use
of the previously mentioned capital deployment
which is around $ 16.805 billion. By then, the
banking sector will begin to repay its liabilities using
the revenue generated from its new investments
while preserving additional proﬁts from the third
year until the end of the suggested plan.
Below you will ﬁnd two tables revealing the estimated annual return and P&L if this plan is implemented based on two scenarios:
Scenario I: The Banking sector's estimated annual
return and P&L in billions of USD if the proﬁt is
reinvested (see Table 6):
Based on international numbers, the expected
average annual return is around 22.34%, which was
used along with the estimated capital to be deployed
in the banking system to calculate the sector's
average cumulative yearly return.
The banking sector's estimated P&L between the
third and the ﬁfth-year renders between $0.1797
billion and $0.2288 billion. Starting from the 6th
year, the estimated proﬁts increase as the account
below $100,000 will be fully compensated to reach
around $1.4565 billion at the end of year twelve.

Table 5. Banking sector's liabilities if the suggested plan is applied (Billion of USD).
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

FC deposits
$ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 e
e
e
e
e
e
e
liabilities 5 year
FC deposits
e
e
$ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235
liabilities 10 year
Total liabilities
$ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 3.5749 $ 3.5749 $ 3.5749 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235
(in $ billion)
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Table 6. The Banking sector's annual return and P&L if the proﬁt is reinvested (in billion of USD).
1
Estimated
annual return
Total liabilities

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7947

$ 3.8037

$ 3.8057

$ 4.0187

$ 4.0663

$ 4.0770

$ 4.0793

$ 4.0799

$ 4.0800

$ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 3.5749 $ 3.5749 $ 3.5749 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235

P&L (in $ billion) $ ¡0.9514 $ ¡0.9514 $ 0.1797

$ 0.2198

$ 0.2288

$ 1.1822

$ 1.3952

$ 1.4428

$ 1.4535

$ 1.4558

$ 1.4564

$ 1.4565

Table 7. The banking sector's estimated annual return and P&L if the proﬁt is not reinvested (in billion of USD).
1
Estimated
annual return
Total liabilities

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 3.7546

$ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 3.5749 $ 3.5749 $ 3.5749 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235 $ 2.6235

P&L (in $ billion) $ 0.9514 $ 0.9514 $ 0.1797

$ 0.1797

$ 0.1797

Scenario II: The banking sector's estimated annual
return and P&L in billions of USD if the remaining
proﬁt is not reinvested (see Table 7):
The same method is applied as the previous table
but what differentiates it is that the proﬁt is not
reinvested or cumulative. The expected average
annual return (22.34%) was employed along with
the estimated capital to be deployed in the banking
system to compute the sector's average yearly return, which amounts to $ 3.7546 billion.
The estimated proﬁt between year 3 and year 5 is
around $0.1797 billion. As of the 6th year, the
banking sector's yearly proﬁts reach approximately
$1.1311 billion till the remainder of the plan's
duration since, as mentioned previously, the account below $100,000 will be fully reimbursed.

Disclaimer
Due to the low transparency standards and the lack
of published data, the numbers employed in this study
are based on the available secondary data as well as
our estimations. The provided restructuring plan is
based on the latest data provided by BDL and should
be reconsidered when adopting the plan based on
accurate available data, and the banks should conduct
a complete feasibility study to check the best areas to
invest in to attain the ultimate goal outcomes.

5. Conclusion
According to the latest World Bank Lebanon
Economic Monitor (LEM), Lebanon is sinking, and
its economic and ﬁnancial crisis is possibly to rank
in the top 3 most severe episodes since the midnineteenth century. Therefore, the USEK Business
School Student Chapter took the initiative to
develop a new business structure that could restore
conﬁdence in the banking sector and generate

$ 1.1311

$ 1.1311

$ 1.1311

$ 1.1311

$ 1.1311

$ 1.1311

$ 1.1311

reasonable income in the upcoming period, especially in these existential moments.
The study proposes a banking sector restructuring
plan encompassing three main areas. A cost reduction area that recommends downsizing the banking
sector, reducing the number of branches and labor
costs as well as moving towards e-banking. A second
area that covers liabilities management, proposes an
aggressive haircut decision and the distribution of
deposits in foreign currency by tranches. And a last
and very important area that can increase the banking
sector's return on investment, income generation.
This area calls on re-imagining the banking sector as
well as its structure by deﬁning a new banking model
and introducing new divisions, granting us access to
the international capital markets, derivatives markets, and structured products.
According to our suggested plan, and analysis, the
banking sector needs time to thrive again. The pace
at which the banking sector recovers is determined
by the readiness to handle the situation rapidly, and
efﬁciently deploy capital. Brieﬂy, the proposal is
divided into two phases, the pre-operating phase
that duration is two years where banks are only
required to cover and reimburse their obligations,
following this phase, using the capital raise that
shall be well deployed for the integrating of a new
banking model, and starting from the third year till
the end of the suggested plan the banking sector
will begin repaying its creditors through the income
generated from its new investments while retaining
additional earnings. Thus, solutions exist and small
depositors shall be protected, however, bold actions
and thoughts are needed.
In conclusion, any business model for any new
division or area to be implemented must include a
full business plan and a feasibility study. The
banking system needs time and will encounter and
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settle many losses at ﬁrst. Only a reform minded
government, which embarks upon a credible plan
toward ﬁnancial and economic recovery, while
collaborating with all stakeholders, can revoke
further sinking of Lebanon.

Conﬂict of interest
No conﬂict of interest only disclaimer as stated
previously.
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